- #Mac adobe updater how to
- #Mac adobe updater update
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These and more of our favorite links can be found on the Links Page. WinSCP - Great free tool for (S)FTP/SSH, includes remote editing of text files, copying files, etc.Ī provides complete online toolbox for animations (GIF and APNG) - Edit, Assemble, Split or Convert, it's all there. Great tool for MacOS X developers, to create your own installer packages (free). Elementary OS, is my favorite Linux distribution.
#Mac adobe updater update
03.26 Not renaming after Monterey update by bronto346.03.26 Need to hire for micro-controller programming, where do I go? by toonces.03.29 WordPress - Cleaning up dangling user meta data (wp_usermeta) by Hans.04.04 Transmission gopro to videoprojector by kiriltchik.04.19 LED Effects - Combine Theater Chase and Strobe (FastLed) by ptitbry.
#Mac adobe updater how to
So it means that we can not change it and its subfiles any more. Unfortunately after directory moving, the owner of “/var/folders/zz/xxxxx_n0000000000000/T/download” is the root, and normal user DO NOT have access to it. Vulnerability 2: Temp Directory Root Protection Can Be BypassedĪs the pseudo below show, in the updating process before SMJobBlessHelper launch ARMDCHammer, download folder(in bundle’s parent directory) will be moved to /var/folders/zz/xxxxx/T/. The directory structure is certainly not credible, we can forge any Bundle ID by creating our special bundle directory. The bundle ID is obtained from Contents/ist of the directory structure.
#Mac adobe updater code
Accept client's XPC connection requestĪpple says it is “A representation of the code and resources stored in a bundle directory on disk.”, so it’s just a directory structure with some well-defined subdirectories/files. The checking logic is as pseudo-code shows below, gets the client’s PID, and then obtains Bundle ID based on the client’s process path, the client will be trusted if its Bundle ID is “”. SMJobBlessHelper is based on NSXPC, its client checking exists in. Vulnerability 1: Bad Checking of NSXPC Connection Client Most XPC services will check its connection client before doing any actual work, so does SMJobBlessHelper. It runs as root and no-sandbox are applied, and hosts an XPC service named SMJobBlessHelper().
#Mac adobe updater software
0x2 AnalysisĬom. within /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/ is one of the components of Adobe Acrobat Reader DC, responsible for software updating. Good news, popular software with high privileged services are new good target in addition to macOS built-in services, so Adobe Acrobat Reader DC catch my attention. They are no longer the king, they imprison themselves in a cage based on declarative sandbox profile rules. However in modern macOS, root processes outside of sandbox are rare, most macOS built-in services run within a sandbox. The root process has superpowers, it almost can do anything, reading/writing all sensitive files/databases such as Images/Calendars.
In this blog, I will analyze the details of vulnerabilities and show how to exploit them.
A normal user on macOS(with SIP enabled) can locally exploit this vulnerabilities chain to elevate privilege to the ROOT without a user being aware. The only requirement needed to trigger the vulnerabilities is that Adobe Acrobat Reader DC has been installed. Today, Adobe Acrobat Reader DC for macOS patched three critical vulnerabilities(CVE-2020-9615, CVE-2020-9614, CVE-2020-9613) I reported. Yuebin Sun( of Tencent Security Xuanwu Lab 0x0 Summary
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